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Comments
Dr. Tele-Corporation: Bridging the
Access-to-Care Gap
Nader Amer*
ABSTRACT
The United States is currently confronting an access-to-
healthcare crisis, which rural regions are experiencing at a dispro-
portionate rate.  Many commentators have touted telemedicine
as a solution for the access-to-care issue.  Telemedicine uses
video and telecommunication technology to allow physicians to
treat patients from distant locations and thus facilitates a more
equal distribution of physicians throughout the United States.
Although the telemedicine industry is quickly growing, the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine impedes the industry’s
expansion and consequently obstructs a viable solution to the ac-
cess-to-care crisis.  Generally, the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine prohibits corporations and limited liability companies
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from employing physicians.  The doctrine stems from a concern
that the corporate business model’s inherent focus on the “bot-
tom line” will inevitably require the sacrifice of quality care for
efficiency.
States should abandon the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine because the concerns that the doctrine seeks to address
are ill-founded and do not account for the modern state of the
healthcare industry.  Further, corporate telemedical providers
that furnish substandard care would be prime targets for class-
action lawsuits or widespread litigation due to telemedicine’s ex-
pansive reach and the corporate form’s ability to facilitate busi-
ness growth.  Lawsuits, including class actions, will effectively
deter any degradation in quality of care because corporations
who render substandard care would face immense liability-risk
exposure and a critical ultimatum:  reform or fail.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The American healthcare system is overburdened, inefficient,
and underserved.1  Although innovations in modern medicine have
begun to address healthcare quality and access concerns, state and
federal laws have failed to keep pace, standing as obstacles to the
advancement and expansion of the healthcare industry.2  One par-
ticular healthcare innovation suffering from inefficient regulation is
telemedicine.3
Broadly speaking, telemedicine refers to “the use of advanced
telecommunications technologies to exchange health information
and provide healthcare services across geographic, time, social and
cultural barriers.”4  Telemedicine provides numerous advantages to
1. See Carl F. Ameringer, State-Based Licensure of Telemedicine: The Need
for Uniformity but Not a National Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 55, 56
(2011) (characterizing the healthcare system as overburdened); Shortage Areas,
HRSA DATA WAREHOUSE, https://bit.ly/2jwIJBl (last visited Oct. 11, 2017) (indi-
cating 3,587 medically underserved areas in the United States and 422 medically
underserved U.S. populations) (follow “Primary Care HPSAs” PDF link under the
“Quick Reports” section) (this source updates on a daily basis; the October 11,
2017 version is on file with author); see also Stephanie Gunselman, Note, The Con-
rad “State-30” Program: A Temporary Relief to the U.S. Shortage of Physicians or a
Contributor to the Brain Drain?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 91, 94 (2009) (discuss-
ing the shortage of healthcare physicians in United States).
2. Hana Sahdev, Note, Can I Skype My Doctor? Limited Medicare Coverage
Hinders Telemedicine’s Potential to Improve Health Care Access, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1813, 1816 (2016); see C.R. Ewell, Telemedicine: Overcoming Obstacles on the
Road to Global Healthcare, 12 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 68, 69–70 (2003) (de-
tailing various telemedical advents in modern medicine and legal impediments to
their usage and proliferation).
3. Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1816; Ewell, supra note 2, at 69–70.
4. JIM REID, A TELEMEDICINE PRIMER: UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 10
(1996).  Jurisdictions and medical authorities vary widely in the definition they
ascribe to the term telemedicine; authorities sometimes use telemedicine inter-
changeably with telehealth, E-health, E-medicine, and cybermedicine. See, e.g.,
Jessica W. Berg, Ethics and E-Medicine, 46 ST. LOUIS L.J. 61, 61 (2002); see also
Ewell, supra note 2, at 69–70.  For this Comment’s definition of telemedicine see
infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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patients.5  For example, Patti Cox, a 55-year-old woman living in
Milford, New Hampshire, suffered from an anterior communicating
artery aneurysm.6  Cox’s primary care physician was unable to
schedule a surgical consult with Cox until nearly a month after her
initial diagnosis, and he could not schedule Cox for surgery until
more than half a month after the scheduled consult.7  Cox was dis-
tressed and anxious to see a doctor because several members of her
family died from similar neurological conditions.8  The next closest
clinic, however, was six hours away.9
Fortunately, Cox’s primary physician referred her to the
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Center for Telehealth, where Cox was able
to schedule a virtual consult within days.10  During Cox’s virtual
consult, Dr. Singer appeared on screen and reviewed Cox’s CT
scans with her.11  Dr. Singer then discussed the surgical procedure
in detail with Cox and quelled Cox’s concerns.12  “Five days later,
[Dr.] Singer performed a coil embolization on Cox’s brain aneu-
rysm,” providing her the lifesaving treatment that would have oth-
erwise been unavailable to her for over three weeks.13
Stories like Cox’s are commonplace;14 yet, so too are the legal
impediments to telemedicine’s proliferation.15  One significant bar-
5. See PAC. NW. EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE CTR., TELEHEALTH: MAPPING
THE EVIDENCE FOR PATIENT OUTCOMES FROM SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, 52–53
(2016) [hereinafter MAPPING THE EVIDENCE], https://bit.ly/2GRaEI9 [https://
perma.cc/T2SM-7R77]; Telemedicine Benefits, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASSOC., https://
bit.ly/2TYuGTp [https://perma.cc/C93U-8PMW]; see also Ewell, supra note 2, at
69–70; see also infra notes 35–154 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of
telemedicine for the healthcare industry).
6. Bonnie Barber, Patient’s “Dreary” Thanksgiving Averted Thanks to
Telehealth, DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK (Dec. 15, 2014), https://bit.ly/2C3ru0C
[https://perma.cc/8RZL-SPQV].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. E.g., Dick Baltus, Stroke Care Close to Home, OR. HEALTH & SCI. UNIV.,
https://bit.ly/2H3JwWe [https://perma.cc/Q7WU-4GMB]; Elizabeth Hayes, How
OHSU Used Telemedicine to Save a Baby’s Life, PORTLAND BUS. J. (Nov. 18,
2013), https://bit.ly/2LNgycd [https://perma.cc/BHX9-JLL9]; Javier’s Story—
Telehealth Helps Manage Diabetes Locally, Telehealth Success Stories, CAL.
TELEHEALTH RESOURCE CTR., https://bit.ly/2AnPAmX [https://perma.cc/P6V9-
KR9W]; see also Brian Monnich, Note, Bringing Order to Cybermedicine: Apply-
ing the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine to Tame the Wild Wild Web, 42
B.C. L. REV. 455, 459–61 (2001) (detailing various success stories related to
telemedicine).
15. See Kimberly Lovett Rockwell, The Promise of Telemedicine Current
Landscape and Future Directions, 96 MI. BAR J., Feb. 2017, at 38, 39–42, https://
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rier to the proliferation of telemedicine is the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine.16  Generally, the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine prevents corporations, limited liability companies, and
non-physicians from employing physicians or having any ownership
interest in physician practices.17  The purpose of the doctrine is to
prevent the commercialization of the medical profession and to
protect professional judgments, thereby ensuring patient quality of
care.18
bit.ly/2AvhpcU [https://perma.cc/Z2KA-M9P4]. Dr. Rockwell describes the cur-
rent legal and regulatory landscape that providers of telemedicine must confront,
specifically identifying the following:  (1) FDA regulations of telemedical device
technology; (2) federal data and privacy laws like HIPPA; (3) scope-limiting re-
strictions on the provision of telemedicine; (4) Medicare and Medicaid reimburse-
ment restrictions; (5) interstate licensure restrictions; and (6) medical malpractice
coverage. Id.
16. See In re Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 701 (1979), 1979 WL 199033
(ordering American Medical Association to “cease engaging in any action that
would . . . characterize as unethical the participation by non-physicians in the own-
ership or management of health care organizations” upon finding that the restric-
tions had the purpose and effect of restraining competition); see also Adam M.
Freiman, Comment, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of
Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health Care En-
vironment, 47 EMORY L.J. 697, 698 (1998) (discussing how the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine stands as a barrier to progression and efficiency in the health-
care industry).  Other obstacles, such as state licensing laws, also pose barriers to
telemedicine’s expansion. See Rockwell, supra note 15, at 41.  States, however,
have begun to create interstate licensing compacts, and thus, licensure laws may
not pose as large of an obstacle for telemedicine to overcome in the near future.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-3602 (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-26-702
(2018); see also INTERSTATE MED. LICENSURE COMPACT, HTTPS://BIT.LY/2RCV8JU
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/2RJX-EN4M].  Licensure laws, however, are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
17. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 195 (2d ed. 2000).
18. E.g., Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 725 N.W.2d 90, 93
(Minn. 2006) (noting concerns the doctrine seeks to address); Carter-Shields v.
Alton Health Inst., 777 N.E.2d 948, 959–60 (Ill. 2002) (discussing that the doctrine
advances the public’s interest in quality healthcare); see also Freiman, supra note
16, at 697–98.  A multitude of government and non-government authorities pro-
vide varying definitions for “quality healthcare” and the concomitant term of mea-
surement, “patient quality of care.” E.g., NAT’L COMM. FOR QUALITY
ASSURANCE, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE QUALITY 6 (2007), https://
bit.ly/2VpQaJG [https://perma.cc/QF3Z-VLAB] (comparing the definition of qual-
ity of care provided by the Institute of Medicine with the definition provided by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality); What Is Quality of Care and
Why Is It Important?, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://bit.ly/2o0Qwp4 [https://
perma.cc/7GRW-JH8U] (detailing various factors taken into account for defining
quality of care in the context of maternal and child health).  Each definition fo-
cuses on patient safety and healthcare outcomes. See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PATIENT
SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-BASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSES 1 (2008),
https://bit.ly/2lX2MrF [https://perma.cc/6A3E-TKDD] (discussing how organiza-
tions have defined quality of care in terms of quality indicators and standards).
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In recent years, however, the doctrine has gone unenforced.19
Due to the current state of the healthcare marketplace, the public
policy grounds that initially gave rise to the doctrine are largely ir-
relevant,20 especially in the context of telemedicine.
This Comment analyzes the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine in the context of telemedicine and how the doctrine’s exis-
tence functions as an impediment to providing expansive access to
healthcare.  This Comment also considers the consequences of
abandoning the doctrine in the telemedical context, giving particu-
lar focus to patient safety and quality of care.  Part II.A discusses
the current uses of telemedicine,21 the advantages the industry pro-
vides,22 and the effects telemedicine has had on the healthcare mar-
ket.23  Part II.A also provides a brief overview of the various entity
forms available to telemedical providers and discusses why the cor-
porate form24 is often seen as the most advantageous entity form.25
Part II.B discusses the origin of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine,26 the theories behind the doctrine’s implementation,27 the
doctrine’s current status in the modern healthcare climate,28 and
the manner in which the doctrine impedes the proliferation and
growth of telemedicine.29  Part III argues for abandoning the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine and details how the advantages
of telemedicine outweigh the inherent concerns of abandonment.30
Part III further argues that any possible degradation in patient
quality of care that may result from abandoning the doctrine would
be short lived and deterred as a result of widespread litigation, in-
cluding class-action lawsuits.31  Due to telemedicine’s expansive
For purposes of this Comment, the phrase “patient quality of care,” or simply
“quality of care,” refers to “[t]he degree to which health services for individuals
and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consis-
tent with current professional knowledge.” Crossing the Quality Chasm: The IOM
Health Care Quality Initiative, NAT’L ACAD. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED., https://
bit.ly/2R700ld [https://perma.cc/9XW2-SJNJ].
19. FURROW ET AL., supra note 17, at 196–97.
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 35–48 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 49–82 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 83–118 and accompanying text.
24. Although this Comment uses the phrase “corporate form” to facilitate the
discussion, the reader should understand the phrase to also encompass limited lia-
bility companies unless context requires otherwise.
25. See infra notes 83–118 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 119–39 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 142–54 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 142–54 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 155–222 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 210–22 and accompanying text.
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reach, corporate providers who furnish substandard care serve as
prime candidates for class-action lawsuits or, at minimum, targets
for widespread litigation.32  The immense liability exposure that ac-
companies such lawsuits would function as a sufficient check on any
corporate desire to sacrifice quality of care.33  Accordingly, substan-
dard care providers would face the prospect of either reforming or
failing.34
II. BACKGROUND
A. Telemedicine: Industry Overview
Before discussing the implications of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine on the telemedical industry, it is necessary to un-
derstand the current telemedical marketplace, the structure of the
marketplace’s providers, and telemedicine’s impact on the overall
healthcare system.
1. What Is Telemedicine and What Services Does the Industry
Offer?
A multitude of jurisdictions and medical authorities provide
varying definitions for telemedicine.35  For purposes of this Com-
ment, Texas law provides an operative definition for telemedicine.36
Telemedicine is:
[A] health care service delivered by a physician licensed in this
state, or a health professional acting under the delegation and
supervision of a physician licensed in this state, and acting within
the scope of the physician’s or health professional’s license to a
32. See infra notes 210–22 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 210–22 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 210–22 and accompanying text.
35. See Ameringer, supra note 1, at 62–63 (noting varying definitions amongst
jurisdictions and medical boards).  Ameringer goes on to indicate that each defini-
tion of telemedicine includes the following:  “(1) ‘the geographic separation be-
tween two or more participants and/or entities engaged in health care,’ (2) ‘the use
of telecommunication and related technology to gather, store and disseminate
health-related information,’ and (3) ‘the use of electronic interactive technologies
to assess, diagnose and/or treat medical conditions.’” Id. (quoting SPECIAL COMM.
ON TELEMEDICINE, N.Y. BD. OF PROF’L MED. CONDUCT, STATEMENTS ON
TELEMEDICINE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CONDUCT (2009)).
36. This Comment adopts Texas’s definition for telemedicine because Texas
has one of the highest shortages of healthcare professionals in the United States.
See Gilbert Eric Deleon, Comment, Telemedicine in Texas: Solving the Problems of
Licensure, Privacy, and Reimbursement, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 651, 659–63 (2003)
(discussing Texas’s healthcare professional shortage in comparison to other areas
of the country).  In an effort to address these issues, Texas has often been at the
forefront of legislation geared toward expansion of access to healthcare and
telemedicine. See id. at 652–53.
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patient at a different physical location than the physician or
health professional using telecommunications or information
technology.37
Today, the telemedical industry encompasses a variety of ser-
vices.  For instance, patients can schedule and attend virtual visits
with physicians through companies like American Well.38  Patients
need only create an account and provide their background informa-
tion to see a physician.39  Thereafter, the American Well website
presents patients with a list of available doctors to choose from,
along with the doctors’ experience levels and customer ratings.40
Patients then may begin their virtual visit, wherein the physician
can review a given patient’s history, answer questions, provide a
diagnosis, treat the patient, and prescribe medications.41  This form
of telemedicine service can also include remote patient monitoring,
wherein patients use devices that “remotely collect and send data to
a home health agency or a remote diagnostic testing facility
(RDTF) for interpretation,” thus supplanting the use of in-home
nursing.42
Another form of telemedicine takes place in the clinical con-
text.43  In the clinical setting, a specialist at a distant location pro-
vides supporting services to an on-site provider, who essentially
functions as the specialist’s hand in rendering diagnoses or treat-
ments.44  The specialist can utilize high-definition video and audio
to examine and communicate with the patient.45  Further, the spe-
cialist can read the patient’s diagnostic information in real time, and
in some instances, may prescribe medication remotely.46  In its most
advanced form, telemedicine can take the form of telesurgery or
37. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 111.001(4) (West 2017).
38. How It Works, AMWELL, https://bit.ly/2A0lNhB [https://perma.cc/797V-
5FFL].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Services Provided by Telemedicine, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, https://
bit.ly/2VrB6eN [https://perma.cc/H4TT-PS7H].
43. See Ewell, supra note 2, at 69.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Kathy Ursprung, A Robot Helped Save Him: Telemedicine Robot
Played Role in Stroke Survival, DALLES CHRON., Mar. 17, 2013, at A1 [hereinafter
A Robot Helped Save Him]; see also Telemedicine Puts a Doctor Virtually at Your
Bedside (PBS NewsHour broadcast July 13, 2015) [hereinafter Telemedicine at
Your Bedside], https://bit.ly/2TomM4A.
46. See A Robot Helped Save Him, supra note 45; see also Telemedicine at
Your Bedside, supra note 45.
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cybersurgery.47  In telesurgery, a physician located at a different site
than the patient utilizes a robot to conduct surgery remotely.48
2. The Impact of Telemedicine on Access to Healthcare
Although “[t]he United States spends more money than any
other country in the world on health services, . . . Americans still
struggle to access affordable care.”49  Telemedicine may present a
viable solution to America’s access-to-care issue.50  To understand
why, it is necessary to examine the underlying sources of the access-
to-care problem.
One of the main obstacles to healthcare access is the shortage
of health professionals in the United States.51  As of 2019, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services indicated that only
43.85 percent of the need for primary medical care professionals is
being met.52  Commentators attribute this overall shortage to the
low number of graduates planning to work in primary care,53 the
47. Ewell, supra note 2, at 69–70; see Margo Goldberg, Note, The Robotic
Arm Went Crazy! The Problem of Establishing Liability in a Monopolized Field, 38
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 225, 225–26 (2012).
48. E.g. Ewell, supra note 2, at 69–70; see Goldberg, supra note 47, at 225–26.
49. Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1821.
50. Id. at 1815.
51. See id. (identifying the primary-care physician shortage and the cost asso-
ciated with in-person physician visits as barriers to access of healthcare).
52. Designated Health Professional Shortage Areas Statistics, HRSA DATA
WAREHOUSE [hereinafter HHRS Shortage Area Statistics], https://bit.ly/2Tvgssh
[https://perma.cc/Q2FY-49AJ] (follow “Designated HPSA Quarterly Summary”
PDF link under the “Download Data” subheading, which can be found under-
neath the “Related Content” section heading).  This source updates on a daily ba-
sis; however, the original document is on file with author.
53. See KATHLEEN BARNES ET AL., OSTEOPATHIC SCHOOLS ARE PRODUCING
MORE GRADUATES BUT FEWER ARE PRACTICING IN PRIMARY CARE (2015)
https://bit.ly/2Fc40cP [https://perma.cc/G4BU-9AXJ] (discussing factors leading to
shortage of graduates becoming primary care physicians); Gunselman, supra note
1, at 94 (noting factors that exacerbate the health professional shortage as includ-
ing fewer graduates planning to work as primary care physicians and general sur-
geons, which is due in part to the high cost of medical school prompting graduates
to specialize in more lucrative practices).  Gunselman notes that primary care phy-
sicians and general surgeons function as the “gatekeepers” of patient care, which is
why the low number of such professionals exacerbates the rate at which patients
are in need of care. Id.
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aging Baby Boomer population,54 and the expansion of coverage
under the Affordable Care Act.55
Further, this shortage of health professionals exists at a dispro-
portionate rate in rural regions,56 which is especially true in the case
of specialists.57  The low pay physicians receive in rural areas,58 the
low quality of life associated with practicing in rural areas,59 and the
limited access to training in nonurban areas are significant causes of
the rural healthcare professional shortage.60  Some commentators
also correlate the rural health professional shortage with the fact
that teaching hospitals are mainly located in metropolitan areas.61
The access-to-healthcare problem in both the rural and the ur-
ban context is also attributable to “costs associated with seeing a
physician in-person, including taking time off from work and ar-
54. Paul Barr, Baby Boomers Will Transform Health Care as They Age,
HOSPS. & HEALTH NETWORKS (Jan. 14, 2014), https://bit.ly/2ihDtxE [https://
perma.cc/9W33-M9ZP]; see Gunselman, supra note 1, at 94.  The aging Baby
Boomer population is relevant for two reasons.  First, medical schools kept enroll-
ment stagnant for two decades because advisory groups failed to take into account
the aging Baby Boomer population. Id.  The Baby Boomer population consists of
approximately 250,000 physicians, many of whom will retire by 2020. Id.  Second,
and more important for purposes of this Comment, the aging population will re-
quire more round-the-clock care, thus increasing the number of patients and, con-
sequently, the number of medical professionals needed to provide that care. See
Aging Baby Boomers Present Array of Healthcare Challenges, PHYSICIANS NEWS
NETWORK (Apr. 17, 2017), https://bit.ly/2AxgkkP [https://perma.cc/8XQS-4DJU];
see also Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1823 (discussing how the aging American popula-
tion will eventually need more services, thereby further burdening an already over-
whelmed system).
55. See Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1823 (“The [physician] shortage is exacer-
bated by the expansion of coverage under the [Affordable Care Act] . . . .”).
56. Gunselman, supra note 1, at 95; see HHRS Shortage Area Statistics, supra
note 52, at 3 (identifying rural regions as accounting for approximately 60 percent
of total health professional shortage designations).  Notably, such regions also suf-
fer from preventable ailments at a disproportionate rate. See U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: E-HEALTH AND
TELEMEDICINE 4 (2016) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://bit.ly/2SI5boF
[https://perma.cc/M9CY-73RP].
57. Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1822.
58. Christopher J. Caryle, Note, Malpractice and Other Legal Issues Prevent-
ing the Development of Telemedicine, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 176 (1998).
59. See id. (“[R]ural physicians suffer from professional isolation[,]” and be-
cause of the shortage in professionals, “rural physicians are often on call for
twenty-four hour emergency care . . . and are unable to receive adequate time
off.”).
60. See Daniel McCarthy, Note, The Virtual Health Economy: Telemedicine
and the Supply of Primary Care Physicians in Rural America, 21 AM. J.L. & MED.
111, 120 (1995) (discussing the lack of continuing education opportunities for phy-
sicians in rural areas, overrepresentation of students with metropolitan back-
grounds in medical schools, and correlation between a physician’s geographical
background and the physician’s geographic area of practice).
61. Id.
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ranging travel.”62  The healthcare professional shortage exacerbates
healthcare costs by creating longer wait times for patients, which
often “results in [patients undergoing] unnecessary and expensive
visits to urgent care and emergency departments for minor con-
cerns.”63  Individuals who opt out of receiving care for minor inju-
ries or illnesses due to the difficulties that accompany obtaining
care further compound the access-to-care problem.64  The individ-
ual’s inability to obtain care may result in aggravated conditions
that require more extensive treatment and often a more expensive
bill.65
Although Congress has attempted to address the access-to-care
issue through various means,66 telemedicine may present the most
effective solution.67
Telemedicine provides an avenue for physicians to circumvent
geographic barriers and meet the needs of underserved communi-
ties.68  Further, telemedicine’s ability to circumvent geographic bar-
62. Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1822.
63. Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1823.
64. See Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1821–23.
65. See id. (explaining that minor injuries could be addressed by virtue of pre-
ventative-care measures often furnished by primary care physicians); see also Car-
oline M. Poma, Telemedicine: A Therapeutic Prescription for Our Healthcare
System Contaminated by Old Economy Rules and Regulations, 17 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. ON. 74, 102 (2016), https://bit.ly/2GVma5o [https://perma.cc/ZMB7-2Y3L]
(discussing how telemedicine provides a path to improved health through prevent-
ative-care measures).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 254d (2018) (establishing National Health Service Corps
(NHSC) and indicating the entity’s purpose as eliminating health manpower
shortages); National Health Services Corps, HRSA HEALTH WORKFORCE [herein-
after NHSC History], https://bit.ly/2ypGwz0 [https://perma.cc/U239-Q8RY].  Con-
gress developed the NHSC in response to the healthcare crisis in the 1950s and
1960s when physicians were retiring at a rate disproportionate to physicians enter-
ing the profession. NHSC History, supra note 66.  The healthcare market is cur-
rently undergoing a similar retirement boom. See supra note 52 and accompanying
text.  In an effort to attract physicians to rural areas, the program provides, among
other initiatives, scholarships, a loan repayment program for continued service in
rural regions, and funding for continued education training and networking oppor-
tunities. See NHSC History, supra note 66; see also Gunselman, supra note 1, at
91–92 (discussing that Congress’s enactment of the Conrad State-30 program was
to attract foreign physicians to the United States to alleviate rural healthcare
shortages).
67. See McCarthy, supra note 60, at 127–28 (discussing that telemedicine can
better address the shortage of primary care physicians in rural areas); see also
Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1815–16, 1822 (explaining that telemedicine can bridge the
access-to-care gap because the technology circumvents geographic, temporal, and
resource barriers).
68. Rockwell, supra note 15, at 38 (discussing that telemedicine increases the
number of providers able to serve a given population); Bill Frist, Telemedicine: A
Solution to Address the Problems of Cost, Access, and Quality, HEALTH AFFAIRS
(July 23, 2015), https://bit.ly/1frxTFQ [https://perma.cc/TTZ2-ENRX] (discussing
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riers would also circumvent physician quality-of-life concerns in
several respects.69  First, telemedical providers would alleviate the
workload of rural physicians by either taking on more of the rural
physicians’ patients70 through a collaborative telemedical network
system71 or furnishing preventative-care services to at-home pa-
tients.72  This strategy would thwart the number of emergent situa-
tions requiring the attention of an on-site physician.73  Second,
telemedicine would provide rural physicians with more opportuni-
ties for continuing medical education and would “reduce[ ] profes-
sional isolation by allowing physician-to-physician consultation.”74
Third, physicians in metropolitan areas would not have to relocate
and acclimate to rural life, thus furnishing rural providers with ac-
cess to specialists that otherwise would be unavailable.75
Telemedicine would also address the problems associated with
the patient-population increase in several ways.  As discussed
above, the convenience of telemedicine will prompt more Ameri-
cans to seek preventative care,76 thereby decreasing emergency
care.77  Further, remote monitoring services provide an avenue for
health professionals to tend to patients with chronic illnesses, which
proves especially advantageous for elderly patients who often suffer
how telemedicine could strengthen access to care by giving underserved areas ac-
cess to physicians that are in states with higher than necessary physician-to-patient
ratios); see also U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., STATE-LEVEL
PROJECTIONS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND PRIMARY CARE PRACTITIONERS:
2013–2025, at 5 (2016), https://bit.ly/2LTbUcv [https://perma.cc/63HZ-68HP] (indi-
cating a surplus of 1,230 physicians in Massachusetts and a shortage of 2,840 physi-
cians in Texas).
69. See McCarthy, supra note 60, at 128.
70. See id.
71. E.g., The OHSU Telemedicine Network, OR. HEALTH & SCI. U., https://
bit.ly/2sdOiqe [https://perma.cc/BX6H-2Z7Z].
72. E.g., The Philips Team, How Innovation Is Helping Seniors Live Longer
and Healthier—at Home, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2015), https://bit.ly/2C3MvZi [https://
perma.cc/5P82-N4LZ].
73. See McCarthy, supra note 60, at 127 (discussing how telemedicine in-
creases the pool of available providers).
74. See id.
75. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 56, at 4 (noting that telemedicine
will provide rural communities access to specialists who are scarce in rural areas);
Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1822 (discussing how telemedicine provides access to spe-
cialists who are typically sparse in rural areas).  See McCarthy, supra note 60, at
129 for a discussion on how telemedicine would also provide a multitude of eco-
nomic advantages to the local and metropolitan provider.
76. See Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1822 (explaining that telemedicine provides a
convenient alternative for patients, thus reducing unnecessary emergency-room
visits).
77. See Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1825.
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from chronic illnesses and face mobility issues.78  The ability to con-
duct remote oversight decreases the need for acute medical ser-
vices,79 which assists in driving down the cost of healthcare and
expanding access to care for patients.80  Finally, the overall cost of
telemedicine is much more affordable for patients.81  The average
telemedicine consultation costs $49 as compared to a $145 in-per-
son physician appointment or a $1,957 emergency room visit.82
In sum, telemedicine provides numerous advantages to pa-
tients and physicians alike.  The technology’s ability to reach across
state borders allows for a more even distribution of provider acces-
sibility, enhanced educational opportunities for rural physicians,
and greater access to specialty services.  The convenience of using
telemedicine also enhances the ability of patients to receive pre-
ventative care and allows for remote oversight of chronically ill pa-
tients, easing access-to-care and cost issues for patients.
3. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Available Entity Forms
Having established how telemedicine facilitates expansive ac-
cess to healthcare, this Comment now addresses how certain busi-
ness entity forms can facilitate the expansion of the telemedical
industry.  A major premise of this Comment is that the corporate
78. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 56, at 4 (discussing the importance
of telemedicine for elderly patients who face mobility issues); Sahdev, supra note
2, at 1824 (“Telemedicine specifically addresses the needs of elderly patients
through remote monitoring of vital signs and accessibility to health professionals
through virtual communications.”).  As discussed above, the aging Baby Boomer
population is one reason for the healthcare shortage, and thus, telemedicine di-
rectly resolves the emerging elder-care issue by providing physicians with the abil-
ity to allocate time for disease and chronic illness management. See Poma, supra
note 65, at 102–04.
79. “Acute medical services,” also referred to as “acute care,” is defined as
“promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative or palliative actions, whether ori-
ented towards individuals or populations, whose primary purpose is to improve
health and whose effectiveness largely depends on time-sensitive and, frequently,
rapid intervention.”  Jon Mark Hirhson et al., Health Systems and Services: The
Role of Acute Care, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (January 31, 2013), https://bit.ly/
1W4AoOB [https://perma.cc/3TZL-NDFA].  Hirshon further notes that “[t]he
term acute care encompasses a range of clinical health-care functions, including
emergency medicine, trauma care, pre-hospital emergency care, acute care surgery,
critical care, urgent care and short-term inpatient stabilization.” Id.
80. See Estimated Cost Savings, OR. HEALTH & SCI. U., https://bit.ly/2FaVuLi
[https://perma.cc/D98Y-Z44X] (noting that OHSU Telemedicine Network saved
patients more than $10.6 million in transportation alone, by providing access to
specialty care in their home community); Sahdev, supra note 2, at 1824–25 (noting
that consistent remote oversight of patients suffering from chronic ailments helps
to lower costs for patients by reducing emergency room visits).
81. See supra note 78.
82. Poma, supra note 65, at 101.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-2\DIK204.txt unknown Seq: 14 24-JAN-19 11:28
494 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:481
business form facilitates industry expansion.  To understand how
the corporate form facilitates such expansion, this section will pro-
vide a brief overview of alternative business entity forms and a dis-
cussion of the comparative advantages of the corporate form.83  The
core distinction between each business form lies in their ability to
limit personal liability of the entity’s owner(s)84 and to facilitate
raising investment capital.85
The first entity forms this Comment will examine are sole pro-
prietorships, general partnerships, and limited partnerships.  A sole
proprietorship is a business where “one person owns all the busi-
ness’s assets, owns all of the profits derived from its operations, and
has unilateral management authority.”86  The sole proprietorship
does not provide any degree of limited liability to the owner, and
the owner bears all of the responsibilities of managing the
business.87
A general partnership is an entity consisting of “two or more
persons [who] agree to act as co-owners of a business for profit.”88
General partners share equally in the business’s profits and losses
and do not enjoy any degree of limited liability.89  Absent an agree-
ment to the contrary, general partners also share equally in manag-
ing the business.90
A limited partnership is similar to a general partnership, but it
has a class of partners known as limited partners.91  Limited part-
ners act as passive investors and enjoy limited liability.92  General
83. See infra notes 84–118 and accompanying text.  This section will examine
general legal principles that govern the various business forms rather than any
specific state’s laws.
84. Limited liability means that the owner(s) of a business cannot be held
responsible for the tortious conduct or contractual obligations of the business be-
yond the amount the owner has voluntarily invested. See THERESA A. GABALDON
& CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 24–25 (Erwin Chemerin-
sky et al. eds., 2016).
85. See id. at 27–28, 38.
86. Id. at 34.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 35.  The lack of limited liability in a general partnership makes the
owners, otherwise known as partners, jointly and severally liable for all debts and
obligations of the partnership. E.g., Head v. Henry Tyler Constr. Corp., 539 So. 2d
196, 197 (Ala. 1988) (“A partner of a general partnership is jointly and severally
liable for all debts and obligations of the partnership.”).
90. GABALDON & SAGERS, supra note 84, at 194–95.
91. See id. 36.
92. Id.  Depending on the state, limited partners may lose their limited liabil-
ity “to persons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably be-
lieving, based upon the limited partner’s conduct, that that the limited partner is a
general partner.” See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
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partners manage the business,93 but limited partners can vote to re-
move a general partner.94
Each of the ownership interests in the aforementioned business
forms are considered relatively illiquid, which creates obstacles in
raising capital for the business—such capital generally being neces-
sary for the expansion and growth of a business.95  The transfer of a
sole proprietor’s ownership interest is illiquid because the trans-
feree must take on the entire business, its management operations,
and the accompanying liabilities.96  The owner is unable to take on
investments from other individuals without facing the risk of form-
ing a default partnership.97
An ownership interest in a general partnership has low liquid-
ity because the transferee of the partnership interest receives only a
right to the profits and distributions that the partnership may de-
clare in its discretion.98  The transferee has no right to access part-
nership information or to participate in management.99  Only the
unanimous vote of the partners will make the transferee a partner
and avail the transferee to such rights.100  Upon being voted in as a
partner, however, the transferee will be exposed to unlimited liabil-
ity and will still have no right to interim distributions, although the
transferee may be in a better position to effectuate his will.
An interest in a limited partnership can be illiquid largely due
to the same concerns that plague general partnerships:  the transfer
1985).  In other states, however, limited partners may participate in management
without becoming liable for the partnership’s obligations, although they will re-
main liable for their own conduct. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2001) (amended 2013).
93. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 406; see also REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP
ACT § 403.
94. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 608; see also REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT
§ 303 (noting that a limited partner will not lose limited liability by exercising the
rights and power conferred upon them by the limited partnership agreement).
95. Id.
96. See STEVEN R. GERSZ, LEXISNEXIS ANSWERGUIDE NEW YORK BUSINESS
ENTITIES § 2.30 (2019 ed. 2018).
97. See id.
98. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 503 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997)
(amended 2013); GABALDON & SAGERS, supra note 84, at 215–16.
99. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 503.  The inability to participate in manage-
ment or receive distributions can result in an interest holder being taken advantage
of by the partners who control when distributions are made. GABALDON & SAG-
ERS, supra note 84, at 216.  Such circumstances create an issue for the interest
holder because the partnership’s tax liability passes through to the interest holder
in proportion to his ownership share, but the interest holder might not receive a
distribution equal to the amount of his tax liability, which would thus force him to
pay for such liabilities out of pocket. See, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
100. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(i).
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of a general partner’s or a limited partner’s interest will only entitle
the transferee to the interim distributions that the limited partner-
ship chooses to declare.101  The transferee may be voted in as either
a limited partner or a general partner upon the unanimous consent
of the partners, provided the partnership agreement allows for such
a transfer.102
Accordingly, except in limited circumstances, the aforemen-
tioned business forms are not particularly attractive to investors,
which can limit a business’s growth potential by depriving the busi-
ness of investors and the necessary capital for expansion.103
Another entity form, the limited liability company (LLC),
combines the flexibility of general partnerships as a contractual en-
tity with the corporate form’s attribute of limited liability.104  LLC
interests can be highly liquid because they are easily transferable,
especially if the company is publicly traded.105
The corporate form provides limited liability but does not offer
the same degree of flexibility in management structure and opera-
tion as LLCs.106  State statues normally require corporations to es-
tablish a specified management structure.107  Owners of the
corporation, also known as shareholders, “lack any right of direct
involvement in the company’s management, and participate only
101. As with the transfer of a general partnership interest, the transferee will
not have the right to access partnership information or effectuate any other rights
that attach to the original ownership interest. See GABALDON & SAGERS, supra
note 84, at 286.  The transferee may obtain those rights only if the partners unani-
mously consent to the transferee’s admission as a general or limited partner and
the partnership agreement allows for the transferee’s admission. Id.  Note that the
same risks associated with the lack of management rights discussed supra note 99
are equally applicable in the context of a limited partnership. See id. at 285–87.  In
addition to those concerns, transferees of limited partnership interests may be una-
ble to bring derivative actions against the partnership, which can deprive the trans-
feree of a number of avenues for redress when faced with oppression by the
partners. See id. at 286.  If the partnership agreement does provide for freely
alienable limited partnership interests, however, barring constraints imposed by
securities laws, the interest can be highly liquid. See id. at 285–86.  Nonetheless, if
the limited partnership is a medical provider, the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine will still prohibit investments from non-physicians.  See, e.g., 225 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 60/22.2(c) (2019) (requiring all owners of an entity that provides
medical services to be licensed medical practitioners).
102. See GABALDON & SAGERS, supra note 84, at 286.  Should the limited
partnership admit the transferee as a general partner, the transferee will be ex-
posed to unlimited liability. Id.
103. ZOLMAN CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING
§ 1.03 (2018).
104. See GABALDON & SAGERS, supra note 84, at 37.
105. Id. at 37.
106. Id. at 37–38.
107. Id. at 37.
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through their power to vote at shareholder meetings.”108  Share-
holders elect the board of directors and may remove the board for
cause or at will depending on the laws of the state of incorporation,
the corporation’s bylaws, and the corporation’s articles of incorpo-
ration.109  The board of directors controls the policies and overarch-
ing direction of the corporation and usually has the power to
appoint and remove corporate officers.110  Corporate officers man-
age the day-to-day affairs of the corporation.111
The formal structure of a corporation often provides investors
with assurances in regard to expectations of the entity’s manage-
ment.112  Further, “[s]hareholders can enjoy a return on their in-
vestment either by receiving distributions of profit113 . . . or by
selling shares to capture appreciation in their value.”114  Accord-
ingly, if the company is publicly traded, corporate stock can be
highly liquid.115  This liquidity, in turn, allows for ease in raising
capital, which can lead to the business’s growth and expansion.116
Even though telemedicine expands access-to-care and the cor-
porate form promotes business growth and industry expansion, the
law forbids their combination.117  As discussed below, the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine stands as a blockade to creating an
efficient and effective healthcare system.118
B. The Current Regulatory Framework of Medicine and the
Evolution of the Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine
The medical profession characterizes itself as one of self-regu-
lation, but a plethora of laws, ethical requirements, and medical
guides govern the doctor-patient relationship.119  Generally, state
laws, through state medical licensing boards, regulate the practice
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 37–38.
112. See CAVITCH, supra note 103.
113. Corporations are subject to double taxation. GABALDON & SAGERS,
supra note 84, at 32.  Thus, shareholders are not subject to the same tax liability
risks that accompany partnerships, as described above. See id. at 38.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See infra notes 119–54 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 154–222 and accompanying text.
119. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 4–9 (1982).
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of medicine.120  Despite a long history of attempted regulation, the
modern medical regulatory system is a relatively recent institu-
tion.121  Medical licensure boards came into existence in the late
19th century through the efforts of the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA).122
In 1847, a number of doctors banded together to form the
AMA to regain control over the profession from unskilled practi-
tioners.123  The AMA lobbied state legislatures to adopt licensing
laws that imposed certain requirements, which included graduating
from an approved medical school and passing an independent med-
ical examination.124  Thereafter, the AMA continued to exert influ-
ence on state licensure boards to adopt more stringent standards
and reform medical education.125  Although the AMA does not re-
tain any legal authority as a regulatory organization,126 the AMA
participates in a number of regulatory groups,127 provides signifi-
cant guidance in establishing accepted medical practices, and heav-
ily influences state legislators.128
The prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine is
one example of the AMA’s ability to influence state legislators.  Al-
though the corporate practice of medicine doctrine varies among
the states, the doctrine generally prohibits the following:  (1) corpo-
rations and limited liability companies from employing physicians
to provide medical services;129 (2) non-licensed persons or entities
120. See About FSMB, FED’N ST. MED. BOARDS., https://bit.ly/2Rb89VW
[https://perma.cc/Y4JT-5UXW].
121. Claudio Violato, A Brief History of the Regulation of Medical Practice:
Hammurabi to the National Board of Medical Examiners, 2 J. SCI. & MED. 122,
122–24.
122. See Freiman, supra note 16, at 699–701.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See Frequently Asked Questions on Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://
bit.ly/2Ar2mB9 [https://perma.cc/8KKZ-9KVQ] (noting that the AMA does not
have legal authority to prosecute ethics violations and that such reports should be
made to state licensing boards).
127. See, e.g., Liaison Committee on Medical Education, ASS’N AM. MED.
COLLEGES., https://bit.ly/2RFn621 [https://perma.cc/NC5U-JBNN] (discussing the
AMA’s role in the Liaison Committee of Medical Education, which is a subsect of
the U.S. Department of Education that accredits medical schools offering a Doctor
of Medicine degree).
128. See Freiman, supra note 16, at 699–702.
129. Katherine R. Lofft et al., Is a Hybrid Just What the Doctor Ordered?
Evaluating the Potential Use of Alternative Company Structures by Healthcare En-
terprises, 25 HEALTH LAW 9, 13 (2013); e.g., Columbia Physical Therapy, Inc. v.
Benton Franklin Orthopedic Assocs., P.L.L.C., 228 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Wash. 2010)
(en banc) (“[T]he corporate practice of medicine doctrine forbids employment of
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from holding an ownership interest in a healthcare entity, control-
ling any aspect of a healthcare entity, or controlling a physician;130
and (3) non-licensed persons or entities from investing in or sharing
in profits derived “from the physicians’ provision of medical
services.”131
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine came into exis-
tence as a result of the AMA’s desire to retain professional auton-
omy, the AMA’s concern that corporate involvement would create
a “‘spirit of trade’”132 within the profession, and the AMA’s fear
that lay control over medical professionals would degrade quality of
care.133  The AMA’s concerns permeated the U.S. legal system, res-
onating in various court decisions as “public policy concerns.”134
Courts and state attorneys general (AGs) created a ban on the cor-
porate practice of medicine through the interpretation of state med-
ical practice acts and medical licensure laws.135  Many medical
practice acts prohibit the practice of medicine by a “person” with-
out a valid license.136  Courts and AGs have found that the use of
health care professionals by business entities or nonprofessionals absent legislative
authorization.”).
130. Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Cor-
porate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 244 (2004); e.g.,
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. v. Acute Care Chiropractic Clinic P.A., 88 F. Supp. 3d 985,
1006 (D. Minn. 2015) (recognizing that an unlicensed person’s ownership of a chi-
ropractic clinic violates Minnesota’s corporate practice of medicine doctrine); Ill.
Farmers Ins. v. Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, Inc., No. 13-CV-2820 (PJS/TNL), 2014
WL 4104789 (D. Minn. Aug. 19, 2014) (noting that a company’s interference with
the judgment of a radiologist is a violation of Minnesota’s corporate practice of
medicine doctrine).
131. Lofft et al., supra note 129, at 13; cf. Steinsmith v. Med. Bd., 102 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 115, 116–18 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing fee-splitting, ownership interests
of non-licensed persons, and corporate participation in the provision of medical
care in the context of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
132. Freiman, supra note 16, at 702 (quoting In re Am. Med. Ass’n, 94 F.T.C.
701, 898 (Oct. 12, 1979), 1979 WL 199033).
133. Id. at 702–04.
134. See Conrad v. Med. Bd., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 902 n.2 (Ct. App. 1996)
(“The ‘principal evils’ thought to spring from the corporate practice of medicine
are ‘the conflict between the professional standards and obligations of the doctors
and the profit motive of the corporation employer.’” (quoting People v. Pac.
Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429, 431 (Cal. 1938))); see also Freiman, supra note 16, at
704–06.
135. E.g., People v. United Med. Serv. 200 N.E. 157, 162–63 (Ill. 1936) (inter-
preting Illinois’s Medical Practice Act as prohibiting corporations from engaging in
the practice of medicine); Winslow v. Kan. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 223 P. 308,
309 (Kan. 1924) (interpreting state licensure laws as prohibiting corporations from
engaging in the practice of dentistry); Nev. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77-219 (Oct. 3,
1977) (interpreting state medical licensure requirements as allowing only natural
persons to practice medicine); see also Freiman, supra note 16, at 704.
136. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2803 (2018); see also Freiman, supra note 16,
at 704.
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the word “person” in these statutes means a “human being.”137  Ac-
cordingly, “[b]ecause the acts of a corporation’s employees are at-
tributed to the corporation,” a corporation’s employment of a
physician would violate state medical licensure provisions.138  Other
state authorities have used a similar rationale in ruling that corpora-
tions are prohibited from practicing medicine, but have focused on
the education requirements underlying the state’s licensure laws
and determined that the corporation, as a “legal fiction,” is unable
to meet such requirements and obtain a license.139
The central focus of the doctrine’s promulgation, however, lies
in public policy.140  Courts often rely on the three following policy
considerations:  “1) commercial exploitation and a lowering of pro-
fessional standards stemming from the overriding profit motive of
corporations; 2) the division of the physician’s loyalty between the
best interests of the patient and profit-making; and 3) lay control of
medical decisions by corporate managers over professional medical
judgment.”141
137. E.g., Early Detection Ctr., Inc. v. Wilson, 811 P.2d 860, 864 (Kan. 1991)
(finding that the legislature’s use of the word “person” in the state’s medical licen-
sure laws prohibits corporations from engaging in the practice of medicine); accord
Cent. Kan. Med. Ctr. v. Hatesohl, 425 P.3d 1253, 1260–61 (Kan. 2018); see, e.g.,
Parker v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs., 14 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1932) (interpreting dentistry
licensure act’s use of “person” as authorizing only “natural persons” to practice
dentistry and not “artificial entit[ies]”); Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-009 (Jan. 28,
1994); see also Freiman, supra note 16, at 704.
138. Freiman, supra note 16, at 704.
139. See, e.g., infra note 147.  Some authorities have also based the corporate
prohibition on state statutes prohibiting fee splitting, see Lofft et al., supra note
129, at 13, and others on state statutes that specifically allow professional corpora-
tions, hospitals, and other entities to practice medicine but do not mention general
corporations. E.g., Ark. Op Att’y Gen. No. 94-204, 1994 WL 481180 (Aug. 17,
1994).  Finally, other states explicitly prohibit corporate practice by statute. See
COLO. REV. STAT. 12-36-134 (2018) (prohibiting general corporations from prac-
ticing medicine and lay persons from being stockholder or directors of a medical
corporation).
140. Id. at 706.
141. Id. (citing Alanson W. Wilcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of
Medicine, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 432, 442–43 (1960); Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health
Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 467 (1987)); e.g., Spine Imaging MRI, L.L.C.
v. Country Cas. Ins., No. 10-480 (JRT/ALB), 2011 WL 379100, at *8 (D. Minn.
Feb. 1, 2011) (noting that a policy rationale for the doctrine is to ensure indepen-
dent medical judgment); Bartron v. Codington Cty., 2 N.W.2d 337, 346 (S.D. 1942)
(discussing that the practice of a medicine by a for-profit corporation through li-
censed individuals “debase[s] the profession” and subjects the profession to com-
mercial exploitation); Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 725 N.W.2d 90, 93
(Minn. 2006) (“[T]he public policy considerations in applying the corporate prac-
tice of medicine doctrine are ‘concerns raised by the specter of lay control over
professional judgment, commercial exploitation of health care practice, and the
possibility that a health care practitioner’s loyalty to a patient and an employer will
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Nonetheless, exceptions to the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine exist.  Non-profit corporations are often exempt from the
prohibition because profits are not the entity’s motivation; thus, the
concern that the corporation will prioritize profit above quality
does not apply.142  A second exception that all states provide is the
professional corporation, which states often require to be entirely
owned and managed by licensed members of the medical profes-
sion.143  Finally, many states exempt Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions (HMOs)144 and, in some instances, hospitals.145
The existence and enforcement of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine also varies dramatically from state to state.146  A
2006 survey indicated that 29 states prohibit the corporate practice
of medicine via statute, case law, or AG opinion.147  Four states ex-
be in conflict.’” (quoting Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins., 703 N.W.2d
513, 517 (Minn. 2005)).
142. Id. at 706–07; e.g., Grp. Health Ass’n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446
(D.D.C. 1938) (finding that actions of nonprofit associations are not the practice of
medicine). But see Cal. Physicians’ Serv. v. Aoki Diabetes Research Inst., 78 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 646, 653 (Ct. App. 2008) (noting that nonprofits are not categorically
outside the corporate practice of medicine ban).
143. Id. at 707; e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 89.050 (2018); Columbia Physical
Therapy, Inc., P.S. v. Benton Franklin Orthopedic Assoc., P.L.L.C., 228 P.3d 1260,
1265–66 (Wash. 2010) (noting that the professional corporation is exempt from the
prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine); Estate of Harper v. Denver
Health & Hosp. Auth., 140 P.3d 273, 276 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[P]hysicians may be
employed by . . . professional service corporations owned by physicians . . . .”).
144. E.g., Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 518
(Minn. 2005) (recognizing that HMOs are exempt from the corporate practice pro-
hibition); see Freiman, supra note 16, at 707.  This Comment references HMOs
only to give a complete understanding of how the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine has come to exist and function in the modern healthcare climate.  Al-
though HMOs underscore how illogical the doctrine is, they are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
145. Daly v. Aspen Ctr. for Women’s Health, Inc., 134 P.3d 450, 452 (Colo.
App. 2005) (“Doctors now may be employees of hospitals . . . .” (citing COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7(2) (2018)); Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688
N.E.2d 106, 113 (Ill. 1997) (holding that licensed hospitals, whether for profit or
nonprofit, are exempt from corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
146. See Freiman, supra note 16, at 713.
147. See MARY H. MICHAL ET AL., CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
DOCTRINE: 50 STATE SURVEY SUMMARY 1–16 (2006), https://bit.ly/2RCiYQ0
[https://perma.cc/S6PE-QXRK] (AZ, ARK, CA, CO, CN, FL, GA, ID, IL, KA,
KY, MD, MA, MI, MN, NV, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OR, PA, SC, SD, TX, WA, WV,
WI).  Michal et al. list Delaware as having no guidance on the matter, however,
upon review of the laws of the 50 states, Delaware can be added to the list of those
states prohibiting the corporate practice of medicine based on AG opinion.  Dela-
ware’s AG has interpreted Delaware’s statutory licensure and educational require-
ments as prohibiting the corporate practice of optometry except when done as a
professional service corporation because a corporation cannot obtain an education
or meet certain other statutory requirements to obtain a license.  Del. Op. Atty.
Gen. No. 85-I011, 1985 WL 165944 (June 18, 1985).  Although the AG’s opinion
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pressly allow the corporate practice of medicine by case law or stat-
ute.148  Fourteen states and the District of Columbia allow the
corporate practice of medicine by either AG opinion or absence of
law on the matter, and thereby subjects those states to the whims of
the judiciary and future AGs.149  In the remaining three states—
Indiana, Ohio, and Oklahoma—it is unclear whether the corporate
practice of medicine is prohibited due to AG or judicial opinions
conflicting with regulations.150
States that do prohibit the corporate practice of medicine
charge the AG with enforcing the doctrine.151  Because the priori-
ties of each state’s AG may differ, enforcement of the doctrine var-
ies widely among states.152  Some states enforce the doctrine
strictly, others sporadically, and others not at all.153  Accordingly,
this sporadic and varying enforcement creates a great deal of uncer-
tainty for entrepreneurs who seek to create corporations that pro-
vide medical services.154
III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview
States can alleviate the tension between healthcare market-
place efficiency and healthcare quality by abandoning the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine in the specific context of
telemedicine.  Commentators have questioned whether the corpo-
concerned only the practice of optometry, the opinion’s underlying rationale
would likely extend to other healthcare professionals because state statutes impose
similar licensing and educational requirements for physicians. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24 § 1720 (2018).
148. See MICHAL ET AL., supra note 147, at 1–16 (NE, TN, UT).  Upon review
of the laws of the 50 states, Alaska can be added to the list of those states that
expressly allow the corporate practice of medicine. See A.A. Pain Clinic, Inc. v.
Sisters of Providence in Wash., No. 3AN-S98-4312 CI, 1998 WL 35151315, at *1
(Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 1, 1998) (denying defendant’s argument that corporation
did not have standing to sue based on the theory that corporation cannot practice
medicine, and recognizing that corporations may operate businesses that require
licenses, including medicine, through the corporation’s properly licensed agents).
149. See MICHAL ET AL., supra note 147, at 1–16 (AL, DC, HI, IA, LA, ME,
MS, MO, MT, NH, NM, RI, VT, VA, WY).
150. See id. at 12.
151. E.g., Trieber v. Aspen Dental Mgmt., 94 F. Supp. 3d 352, 361–62
(N.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing that the attorney general is responsible for enforcing
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in New York); People v. United Med.
Serv., 200 N.E. 157, 159 (Ill. 1936) (noting that state law authorizes the attorney
general to bring an action against corporations that “exercise[ ] powers not con-
ferred by law”); see also Freiman, supra note 16, at 698.
152. Freiman, supra note 16, at 712–13.
153. Id. at 713.
154. Id. at 698.
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rate practice of medicine doctrine meets its purpose in the modern
healthcare climate.155  Although many scholars have advocated for
abandoning the doctrine,156 a few remain steadfast in the belief that
corporate practice is an evil that states must continue to pro-
scribe.157  Each of the doctrine’s policy arguments coalesce into one
central theme:  the need to ensure quality patient care.158  The argu-
ments for bolstered state enforcement of the doctrine presume that
a profit-making motive results in the degradation of quality of care,
and that unlike corporations, physicians are free from any profit-
making influence when they treat patients.159  Accordingly, this
Comment will address the arguments advanced by advocates of the
doctrine through a quality-of-care-focused framework.  The final
policy rationale advanced in support of the doctrine, the need for
155. Jonathan E. Montgomery & Barry F. Rosen, Time to Reform the Corpo-
rate Practice of Medicine Doctrine?, GORDON FEINBLATT (Mar. 24, 2015), https://
bit.ly/2Qr7DxC [https://perma.cc/6VWG-2BAP] (questioning the continued valid-
ity of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in Maryland).
156. See Huberfeld, supra note 130,  at 244 (“The corporate practice of
medicine doctrine is a relic; a physician-centric guild doctrine that is at best mis-
placed, and at worst obstructive, in the present incarnation of the American health
care system.”); Lisa Rediger Hayward, Note and Comment, Revising Washington’s
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 71 WASH. L. REV. 403, 428 (1996) (argu-
ing for limiting the doctrine due to a multitude of factors in the modern healthcare
environment that ensure quality of care, while recognizing the need for continued
assurances that lay control over physician autonomy would be prohibited); Chase-
Lubitz, supra note 141, at 488 (“This prohibition threatens the development of
nontraditional health care delivery systems in many states.  For innovation of de-
livery systems to continue, state courts and legislatures should modify corporate
practice prohibitions to reflect current views on physician autonomy and the role
of commercialism in medicine.”).
157. See Andre Hampton, Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate
Practice of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogma New Tricks, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 489,
492 (1998) (arguing for the resurrection of the corporate practice of medicine doc-
trine to reduce conflicts of interest between insurers and medical professionals);
Ewell, supra note 2, at 75 (arguing for revitalized enforcement of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine in the context of telemedicine to ensure quality of
care in Internet medicine).
158. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallela, 372 F.3d 500, 503 (2d Cir.
2004) (noting that the state’s concern in prohibiting the corporate practice of
medicine was to ensure that the quality of care afforded to patients was not under-
mined.); Cal. Physicians’ Serv. v. Aoki Diabetes Research Inst., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d
646, 654 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The ban on the corporate practice of medicine is meant
to protect patients . . . .”); Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 725
N.W.2d 90, 95 (Minn. 2006) (noting the purpose of the doctrine is to protect
patients).
159. Freiman, supra note 16, at 706.  As noted above, courts have identified
various public policy considerations underlying the doctrine, such as preventing
“commercial exploitation and a lowering of professional standards stemming from
the overriding profit motive of corporations . . . [and preventing] the division of the
physician’s loyalty between the best interests of the patient and profit-making.”
Freiman, supra note 16, at 706
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physicians to be free from lay influence,160 has been explored thor-
oughly in other works161 and will not be addressed here.
B. Reasons for Eliminating the Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine
This Comment advances four reasons for eliminating the cor-
porate practice of medicine doctrine:  (1) profit-making motives are
prevalent in the current healthcare industry and do not degrade
quality of care; (2) the doctrine chills the proliferation and expan-
sion of the telemedical industry and thus impedes access-to-care;
(3) the doctrine limits the causes of action that injured patients may
pursue against providers who furnish substandard care; (4) litiga-
tion risks, including class-action lawsuits, mitigate any residual risks
associated with abandoning the doctrine.
1. Continued Prevalence of Profit-Based Decision-Making and
Its Non-Correlation with Substandard Care
Courts and empirical studies alike have concluded that profit-
making motives influence physicians in treating patients.162  Evi-
dence as to whether a doctor’s profit-making motive has caused in-
jury, however, is inconclusive.163  Indeed, commentators have
indicated that a physician’s profit-making motive may be beneficial
in some instances.164  The Institute of Medicine has even advocated
for utilizing the physician’s profit-making motive to ensure in-
creased quality in patient care.165  By aligning a provider’s profits
160. See Freiman, supra note 16, at 702–04.
161. See PAMELA MARTIN & ANNE NEVILLE, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE IN A CHANGING HEALTHCARE ENVIRONMENT 20 (2016), https://bit.ly/
2RBcroW [https://perma.cc/37FE-GB8D] (discussing surveys relating to physician
employment in lay-controlled entities and its lack of impact on physician auton-
omy); Huberfeld, supra note 130, at 258 (discussing loss of physician autonomy in
managed care organizations).
162. See Isles Wellness, Inc., 703 N.W.2d at 524 (agreeing that physicians are
not free from fiscal influence in decision-making); MARTIN & NEVILLE, supra note
161, at 20 (noting that profits influence physicians); Huberfeld, supra note 130, at
245 (“Also, in this era of managed care reimbursement, where physicians are
forced to bear the risk of providing patients too much time or too many services,
the time has come to realize and accept that physicians are, in fact, influenced by
financial gain (or loss).”).
163. MARTIN & NEVILLE, supra note 161, at 21 (“What remains unclear is the
extent to which patients were harmed—or in some cases, perhaps even helped—as
a result of [physician profit motivated decision-making] bias.”).
164. Id. (“[I]t is possible that, even if financial relationships are changing phy-
sician behaviors, they are changing them for the better in certain situations.”).
165. See Huberfeld, supra note 130, at 269–70 (“The IOM makes a strong
point that current payment policies should be wholly revised to positively influence
health care providers to ‘align[ ] . . . payment incentives with quality improve-
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with a physician’s ability to render effective care, patients would
reap not only the benefits of increased quality and efficiency of care
but also increased access to care.166
Similar to the Institute of Medicine’s theory, a corporation’s
profit-making motive can ensure increased quality and efficiency in
care.  The corporation’s profit-making motive would require the en-
tity to (1) search for efficient solutions to patient problems,167 (2)
utilize preventative-care measures, and (3) ensure the highest qual-
ity of care to earn the most profits,168 while avoiding liability expo-
sure that could be detrimental to profits.169
Moreover, scholars alleging that corporate involvement would
degrade quality of care have failed to provide any data to support
their conclusion and often couch their arguments in theory and
speculation.170  The available data suggests the opposite:  “allowing
ment.’” (citing INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2001))).
166. See id. (tracing how the corporatization of healthcare creates a synergy
between business and health professionals that ultimately benefits patients).
167. See id. at 276–77 (discussing efficiency in medicine by removing the cor-
porate practice of medicine doctrine).
168. See id.
169. See E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and
Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 973–75 (1999) (discussing the
use of entities to ensure efficiency while preventing liability).
170. See e.g., Ken Marcus Gatter, The Continued Existence and Benefit of
Medicine’s Autonomous Law in Today’s Health Care System, 24 DAYTON L. REV.
215, 220, 270–82 (1999) (discussing quality of care as being one of the reasons for
the prohibition of corporate practice of medicine, while failing to provide any data
that supports such a conclusion); Andre Hampton, Resurrection of the Prohibition
on the Corporate Practice of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogma New Tricks, 66 U.
CIN. L. REV. 489, 510 (1989) (recognizing that data concerning decline in quality of
care based on corporate profit motives is speculative).  Hampton argues for the
resurrection of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to combat “disrup-
tions” in the doctor-patient relationship that have arose from federally sanctioned
payment structures known as “risk sharing.”  Hampton, supra note 170, at 501–02.
“Risk sharing involves shifting some of the cost of providing health care from the
[insurance companies] to the physicians,” and thereby aligns the physician’s finan-
cial interests with the payer. Id. at 502–06.  Hampton argues that such risk-sharing
plans are a clear violation of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and are
contrary to the policies underpinning the doctrine—specifically posing a danger to
quality patient care. Id. at 507–08.  Nonetheless, Hampton concedes that “the dan-
ger of risk sharing to patients is apparently largely speculative. . . . [and that] em-
pirical research has not revealed any correlation between risk-sharing
arrangements and any decline in quality of care.” Id. at 510.  Although risk shar-
ing is only a subset of practices prohibited by the doctrine, Hampton’s concession
exemplifies how the underling policy rationale—that corporate involvement inevi-
tably degrades quality of care—is baseless.
It should also be noted that prior to the “risk sharing” payment model, physi-
cians functioned under a fee-for-service system where physicians were paid for
every test or procedure they conducted. Id. at 505–06.  Under the fee-for-service
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doctors to contract for employment with corporate entities in-
creases access to care without diminishing the quality of that
care.”171  Thus, the first two premises of the doctrine, that a corpo-
ration’s profit-making motive will degrade quality of care and that
physicians are free from any profit-making motive, are invalid.
2. The Doctrine Chills the Proliferation of Telemedicine and
Consequently, Access to Care
As discussed above, telemedicine provides an avenue for alle-
viating healthcare costs and expanding access to healthcare through
the use of telecommunications technology.172  By using corpora-
tions as a vehicle for business growth and industry expansion, states
and entrepreneurs can make telemedicine more widely accessible to
a variety of populations.  Further, increased competition in the
telemedical industry will force care providers to create more effi-
cient and innovative solutions to drive down costs for customers
and increase profits for shareholders.173
Although the doctrine is either non-existent or unenforced in
many states, the doctrine may nonetheless create a chilling effect on
individuals seeking to enter the telemedicine industry.174  Courts
and commentators alike recognize that unenforced laws can create
a chilling effect on behavior.175  For example, the regulation of ma-
regime, healthcare costs skyrocketed. Id. at 502–03.  The risk sharing model was
implemented as a means to control healthcare costs. Id. at 505.
171. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the Market for Profes-
sional Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179, 198 (2014) (citing ALLEGRA KIM, CAL. RE-
SEARCH BUREAU, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE 22–23
(2007)).
172. See supra notes 49–82 and accompanying text.
173. See Freiman, supra note 16, at 748–50.
174. Id. at 698; William M. Sage & Kelly McIlhattan, Upstream Health Law,
42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 535, 542 (2014) (“Many states allow exceptions, such as
physician employment by hospitals or corporate practice by an . . . entirely physi-
cian-owned [entity].  This variability, however, increases risks and costs for . . .
delivery models that operate in multiple states and therefore that must tailor their
corporate structure and operations to specific [Corporate Practice] doctrines.”);
James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care:
Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459,
1471 (1994) (“While the precise status of the corporate practice doctrine is still a
matter of some dispute, the residual corporate practice doctrine is a potential legal
landmine for an industry seeking to develop new structures and relationships in
response to market pressures.”).
175. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485–87 (1965) (recognizing
the chilling effect of threatened sanctions in the First Amendment context); Tex.
State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir.
1985) (recognizing that the mere existence of an unenforced policy chills protected
expression); Spartacus v. Bd. of Trs., 502 F. Supp. 789, 796–97 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(“Injury to First Amendment rights may result from the threat of enforcement
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rijuana under the Obama Administration proves an analogous
point concerning the chilling effect that unenforced laws can have
on a business.  As of the time of this writing, marijuana is illegal
under federal law, but several states have legalized the substance
for medicinal and recreational use.176  Although the Obama Ad-
ministration indicated that it would not prosecute marijuana distrib-
utors operating in accordance with state law,177 a number of banks
and other ancillary businesses refused to conduct business with ma-
rijuana distributors because the federal government could deem the
distributor’s proceeds illegal or create other operational difficul-
ties.178  Accordingly, although unenforced under federal law and le-
gal under state law, the risks associated with entering the marijuana
industry has created hesitation amongst a number of entrepre-
neurs.179  Thus, even if certain states do not enforce the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine, the doctrine likely creates a chilling
effect on entrepreneurs seeking to enter the industry.
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine significantly limits
technology’s ability to provide expansive access to care by prohibit-
ing corporate entities from engaging in the telemedical industry.180
Allowing corporations to engage in marketplace competition will
force providers to find safe, innovative, and economic solutions to
patient care problems.181  Further, corporate entities will likely seek
itself, since it may chill . . . ardor and eliminate . . . desire to engage in protected
expression.”).
176. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(17) (2018), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 26000–26250 (2018).
177. See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., to all
United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009), https://bit.ly/2CS14R7 [https://perma.cc/
KC4F-682W].
178. See Brett Melson, The Problem with Marijuana Industry Startups, DE-
LAWAREINC.COM (Jan. 9, 2017), https://bit.ly/2s8bRAG [https://perma.cc/3TM5-
D8CC].
179. See id.
180. Robertson, supra note 171, at 197 (“[E]xperience has shown that al-
lowing physicians to practice in ‘efficient and economical’ business forms improves
access to medical care for individuals, especially in rural or remote areas where the
fixed costs of practice may not allow a single doctor’s practice to scale to an effi-
cient level.”) (citing Michelle Gustavson & Nick Taylor, At Death’s Door—Idaho’s
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 479, 518 (2011)).  As
detailed above, high cost of care is one factor that results in decreased access,
which telemedicine alleviates. See supra notes 49–82 and accompanying text.
181. See James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time,
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2004) (discussing deregulation’s ability to
lead to increased competition, which leads to lower prices); Robert Crandall &
Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric
Industry 6 (1997) (unpublished manuscript), https://bit.ly/2QuRcAF [https://
perma.cc/6J9F-RD2C] (“The record shows that deregulation has generally led to
lower prices, expanded output, and improved choices of service quality.”).
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to capture as much of the market as possible to create the largest
gains possible.182  With the rural population being a largely untap-
ped market,183 corporations will likely seek to expand into rural
sectors.184
3. The Doctrine Fails to Prevent Corporate Involvement and
Limits Actions Against Corporate Defendants
Although the doctrine chills corporate involvement in the med-
ical and telemedical industry, the doctrine fails to entirely eradicate
such involvement.185  Corporations simply construct a work-around
to prevent any allegation that the entity is functioning in violation
of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.186  One way entities
circumvent the doctrine is by structuring the relationship between
itself and the provider as an independent contractor arrange-
ment.187  The independent contractor arrangement limits the form
and number of causes of action an aggrieved patient may pursue
against a telemedical corporation or LLC.188  This section addresses
the causes of action a patient may pursue upon injury by a
telemedical provider.
182. William C. Beckwith, Comment, Cutting the Cord: Removing the CMRS
Spectrum Cap to Promote Wireless-Landline Convergence and Wireless Alterna-
tives in the Local Loop, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 369, 386 (1999) (discussing that
deregulation in the phone industry will cause service providers to move into un-
served rural areas for profit gain).
183. As discussed above, rural populations have an access-to-care dilemma,
which telemedicine seeks to alleviate. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 56.
184. See sources cited supra note 180.
185. MARTIN & NEVILLE, supra note 161, at 4.
186. See id. at 14–19.
187. See, e.g., Conrad v. Med. Bd., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 907–08 (Ct. App.
1996) (discussing use of independent contractor arrangement to circumvent corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine); Doctor on Demand Terms of Use, DOCTOR ON
DEMAND ¶ 19 [hereinafter DD Terms of Use], https://bit.ly/2CS9t7l [https://
perma.cc/KWX2-96ED].  Hospitals and other entities also utilize a number of
other workarounds. See KIM, supra note 171, at 21 (discussing that hospital admin-
istrators use a number of strategies to circumvent the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine).
188. See infra notes 197–209 and accompanying text; see also Daly v. Aspen
Ctr. for Women’s Health, Inc., 134 P.3d 450, 452 (Colo. App. 2005) (discussing that
the prohibition on corporate practice of medicine bars entity liability for malprac-
tice); Estate of Harper v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 140 P.3d 273, 275–76
(Colo. App. 2006) (noting that the entity could not be held liable because it could
not practice medicine under the corporate practice of medicine doctrine).
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a. Malpractice Action Against the Doctor
The first cause of action an injured patient may pursue is medi-
cal malpractice against the doctor.189  To establish a claim for medi-
cal malpractice, the plaintiff must satisfy the same elements of a
traditional negligence claim:190  (1) the doctor owed a duty of care
to the plaintiff; (2) the doctor breached his duty; (3) the breach was
the proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff; and (4) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff were a direct result of the harm.191  To
demonstrate that the doctor owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff must only show that a doctor-patient relationship ex-
isted.192  The customs of the profession determine the duty of care
owed to a patient; however, a physician must generally exercise the
“degree of care, skill, and proficiency exercised by [a] reasonably
careful, skillful, and prudent practitioner[ ] in the same class to
which the physician belongs, acting under the same or similar cir-
cumstances.”193  To demonstrate that the doctor breached his duty,
the plaintiff must show through expert testimony that the doctor
departed from the set standard of care.194  Lastly, the plaintiff must
show that the doctor’s breach of duty caused the plaintiff’s injury in
law and fact.195  Upon establishing each of the requisite elements,
the plaintiff may recover damages from the doctor.196
b. Causes of Action Against a Corporation or LLC
An individual who is injured by an employee of a business can
usually hold the employer vicariously liable for the actions of its
189. Medical malpractice is only one cause of action that a harmed patient
may pursue against a doctor, or as discussed below, an entity.  Depending on the
factual circumstances of the case, breach of contract, fraud, RICO, and other ac-
tions may be viable claims as well. See Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The
Assault on Managed Care: Vicarious Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Ac-
tions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 654–59 (2001) (discussing various forms of liability
that plaintiff attorneys pursue against entities).
190. E.g., Grossman v. Barke, 868 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005);
Verdicchio v. Ricca, 843 A.2d 1042, 1055-56 (N.J. 2004).
191. See Nold ex rel. Nold v. Binyon, 31 P.3d 274, 286 (Kan. 2001) (“[A] doc-
tor owes a duty of care . . . once he or she establishes a doctor-patient
relationship.”).
192. See Ob-Gyn Assoc. of N. Ind., P.C. v. Ransbottom, 885 N.E.2d 734, 740
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
193. Whyde v. Czarkowski, 659 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); e.g.,
Sheeley v. Mem’l Hosp., 710 A.2d 161, 167 (R.I. 1998).
194. Whyde, 659 N.E.2d at 627.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Nestlehutt v. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, No. 2007EV002223-
J, 2009 WL 348361 (Ga. State Ct. Feb. 9, 2009) (discussing various forms of dam-
ages available in malpractice actions, and noting that plaintiffs were awarded dam-
ages after proving their medical malpractice claim).
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employee.197  A cause of action under a respondeat superior theory
of liability requires proof of each of the elements against the em-
ployee, with the additional proof that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment198 when he caused the injury.199
It must be kept in mind, however, that employers are liable
only for the acts of employees.  Generally, employers are not liable
for the torts of independent contractors.200  Nonetheless, an em-
ployer can be liable for the torts of an independent contractor
under various theories of direct liability.201
One potential form of direct liability that a plaintiff can attri-
bute to a telemedical provider is negligent hiring or retention.  A
cause of action for negligent hiring or retention requires the same
proof as that required for a traditional cause of action sounding in
negligence.202  Breach of duty takes into account a variety of factual
considerations, including the independent contractor’s reputation
and the necessary expertise and competencies required for the
job.203
c. The Advantages of Pursuing Entity Liability and the
Attaching Deterrent Effect
Commentators have noted that entity liability is a more prag-
matic solution than holding a doctor individually liable.204  First, the
entity is usually better situated to handle the costs of litigation and
197. Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners Med. Grp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668, 675–76
(Ct. App. 2004).
198. To establish the individual was acting within his scope of employment,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time of commission, the employee was
performing a service in furtherance of the business. See Barclay v. Briscoe, 47
A.3d 560, 567–68 (Md. 2012).
199. Lathrop, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 675–76.
200. See Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 791 (Tex. 2006).  Distin-
guishing between an independent contractor and an employee generally takes into
account eight different factors, the discussion of which is not imperative to this
Comment.  See United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 505 (9th Cir. 2010) for a
discussion regarding those factors.
201. See Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1997).
202. See Asphalt & Concrete Servs. v. Perry, 108 A.3d 558, 571 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2015).
203. Id.
204. See Huberfeld, supra note 130, at 273 (“The American Law Institute his-
torically has suggested that exclusive hospital liability would be more efficient and
promote quality better when a physician negligently causes medical injury in a
hospital . . . .”).  Interestingly, courts are moving towards a more entity-liability-
oriented view.  Huberfeld, supra note 130, at 273–74 (noting that hospitals are be-
ing found liable more often, even when the relationship is found to be one of
independent contract).
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better able to pay damages.205  Moreover, entities are often liable as
a matter of respondeat superior because they are better situated to
prevent injuries caused by their employees by requiring employees
to comply with certain policies and procedures.206
Accordingly, should lay control result in injury, the corporate
medical provider would be subject to suit.  Upon suffering the
repercussions of a successful lawsuit, the provider would reform or
continue to suffer similar lawsuits.207  Analysts have concluded in a
similar context that hospitals, as corporations for which states often
provide an exemption from the corporate practice prohibition,208
would be more efficient at delivering and promoting high-quality
care if they were the ones held liable for medical malpractice.209
Thus, by forcing an independent contractor relationship, the corpo-
rate practice of medicine doctrine deprives harmed patients of the
ability to pursue an entity theory of liability, and thereby deprives
society of the positive externality of effective malpractice
deterrence.
4. Vulnerability to Widespread Litigation Mitigates Residual
Risks That May Accompany Abandoning the Doctrine
Litigation, including class-action lawsuits, would mitigate the
doctrine’s underlying public policy concern that a corporation’s
profit-making motive will result in a degradation of quality of care.
205. Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Ky. 2005) (citing RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 204–05 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that one of
the justifications for respondeat superior is the employer’s ability to afford com-
pensating victims, which is also known as the “deep-pocket” argument for
liability).
206. Id. (suggesting that the sounder rationale for respondeat superior is that
employers are better able to enforce tort law against employees through threat of
termination, which causes employees to be more responsive to tort law than they
would be otherwise).
207. Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Liti-
gation as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 54 (2011) (noting that law suits
are powerful deterrents that impact the behavior of healthcare providers).  Any
objection to such an approach on the grounds of needing to address pre-injury
quality of care risks can be quickly dismissed.  A number of accreditation and gov-
ernmental authorities regulate quality of care by ensuring organizational policies
and procedures are in compliance with current minimum standard of care proto-
cols. See Huberfeld, supra note 130, at 272–75.  Such authorities would act with
equal force to any corporate telemedicial entity. See id.
208. MARTIN & NEVILLE, supra note 161, at 14–15.
209. See Huberfeld, supra note 130, at 273 (“The American Law Institute his-
torically has suggested that exclusive hospital liability would be more efficient and
promote quality better when a physician negligently causes medical injury in a
hospital . . . .”).  See Gatter, supra note 170, at 248–55 for a discussion on the issues
and critiques of the current medical malpractice system.
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The basic requirements for a class-action lawsuit are numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.210
Telemedicine’s ability to provide expansive access to care and
to reach a theoretically unlimited number of patients—and thereby
a theoretically unlimited amount of profit—places telemedical
providers in a business model that is susceptible to the numerosity
requirement.211  Corporations, and business entities generally, are
also more easily able to satisfy the numerosity requirement than
individuals because a larger number of harms or wrongs can be at-
tributed to the entity as opposed to a single person.212
210. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982).  A putative
class must also be of the type maintainable under Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See FED R. CIV. P. 23.  Because a class action of the nature
discussed here would seek money damages, Rule 23(b)(3) would be the most likely
section through which class-counsel could maintain an action against a telemedical
entity. See Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 885–86 (S.D. Ohio 1994).  Rule (b)(3)
certification is the preferred route when monetary damages are the plaintiffs’ pri-
mary goal.  Id.  Rule 23(b)(3) requires for a common question to predominate over
any individual questions and for a class action to be superior to other methods of
adjudication. See FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  A detailed discussion of 23(b) is not
warranted for purposes of this Comment.  The purpose of this section is not to
detail every circumstance in which an action may or may not receive class-certifica-
tion, but rather to illuminate three overarching points:  (1) class-action lawsuits are
a pronounced risk for telemedical corporations; (2) class actions or the threat
thereof are one viable method of redressing the concerns that proponents of the
doctrine tout, if or when those concerns arise; and (3) the repercussions of
threatened or actual class actions are against a corporation’s purported sole inter-
est in “the bottom-line.”
211. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012)
(noting that numerosity requires a class to be “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)); see, e.g.,
Kutschbach v. Davies, 885 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (finding that join-
der was impracticable because class members numbered in the hundreds and were
scattered across Ohio); Mathis v. Bess, 138 F.R.D. 390, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (not-
ing that class satisfied the numerosity requirement solely based on the fact that the
class had 120 members); Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 130 F.R.D. 673, 675 (D.
Colo. 1990) (finding that joinder was impracticable because 33 class members were
dispersed throughout the country); Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 628 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (finding a class satisfied numerosity because the class numbered in the
thousands); Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60, 62 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (noting
that numbers alone are dispositive if class is large enough).
212. See Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class
Actions, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 743 (2015), for a discussion on perceived corporate
vulnerability to class-action lawsuits.  The corporation’s and the telemedical indus-
try’s susceptibility to numerosity is the key risk factor that mitigates against any
negative externality of abandoning the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.
Proponents of the doctrine may argue that law suits designed to redress quality of
care issues, such as medical malpractice claims, are unlikely to receive class certifi-
cation because of the individualized nature of such claims. See Epstein & Sykes,
supra note 189, at 653–54 (discussing that class actions are often not viable mecha-
nisms for medical malpractice claims).  Although, as discussed below, policy-based
suits have a higher probability of certification, the proponent’s argument regarding
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A plaintiff can establish commonality by demonstrating that
the class members’ claims would be resolved upon a determination
of whether the corporation had a policy in place or a pattern and
practice of conduct that led to the alleged harm.213  Similarly, a
plaintiff can establish typicality by demonstrating that claims of
“the class and the class representative arise from the same event or
pattern or practice and are based on the same legal theory.”214  A
plaintiff-representative could utilize an entity theory of liability cen-
tered on the corporate telemedical provider’s pattern and practice
or systemic policy of disregarding care for profits to meet the com-
medical malpractice actions has some credit.  Nonetheless, under Rule 23(c)(4), a
court may limit class treatment to specific common issues and require parties to
litigate individualized issues, such as damages, in a separate proceeding. See, e.g.,
Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 910–12 (7th Cir. 2003); Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986).  Further, plaintiffs may be able
to bring class actions that address quality-of-care concerns under other causes of
action. See, e.g., McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F. Supp. 545 (N.D.
Ohio 1995); see also Epstein & Sykes, supra note 189, at 654–59 (discussing various
work-arounds that class-plaintiff’s attorneys use to obtain class certification in the
medical malpractice context).  Finally, even if a significant number of potential
class actions fail to receive certification, the financial risks associated with class-
suits can be just as pervasive when a company faces widespread non-class litiga-
tion, especially in the medical malpractice context. Compare Z.P. v. Detroit Med.
Ctr., No. 06-617459-NH, 2008 WL 5459477 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 9, 2008) (discussing
$500,000 non-class medical malpractice settlement), and Doe v. Physicians, 30
N.Eng. J.V.R.A. 7:C4, 2014 WL 8261482 (Unknown State Ct. (Mass.) June 30,
2014) (discussing medical malpractice action’s settlement of  $5.2 million), and Wil-
liams v. Univ. Chicago Hospital, No. 09-L-1173-D, 2014 WL 3569163 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 5, 2014) (discussing medical malpractice settlement of $17 million), and Plain-
tiff v. Defendant, No. 87294074/CL72740, 1989 WL 1730255 (Unknown State Ct.
(Md.) Jan. 1, 1989) (discussing a jury verdict of $12 million in medical malpractice
action), and Reilly v. Ninia, No. 017904/2003, 2013 WL 4081928 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 16, 2013) (discussing jury verdict of $130 million in medical malpractice ac-
tion), with Martinez v. CA Bus. Venture Inc, No. CIVDS-14-17563, 2015 WL
12763542 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2015) (discussing settlement of a class-action
lawsuit for $300,000); Jackson v. City of Inkster, No. 11-000151-NZ, 2011 WL
8612112 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 28, 2011) (discussing $95,000 settlement of class-ac-
tion lawsuit); Fuenez v. GMG Janitorial Inc., No. CGC-13-532261, 2017 WL
711236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2017) (discussing $1.3 million class-action settle-
ment). But see Engle v. Ligett Grp., Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (discussing
jury’s award of $12.7 million in compensatory damages and $145 billion in punitive
damages in a class-action law suit).
213. See Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (noting that
class members’ claims “must depend upon a common contention . . . . of such a
nature that it is capable of class wide resolution—which means that determination
of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each . . .
claim in one stroke.”); see, e.g., Romano v. SLS Residential Inc., 246 F.R.D. 432,
444–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (certifying class action on a policy based theory).
214. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quotation marks omitted).
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monality and typicality prongs.215  Adequacy of representation sim-
ply requires choosing a plaintiff-representative who does not have a
conflict of interest with other class members and who will prosecute
the action vigorously.216
Should a putative class institute an action against a corporate
telemedical provider, the suit would expose the corporation to a
considerable amount of financial risk due to the high awards of
damages that often accompany class-action lawsuits.217  The corpo-
ration would also suffer a considerable amount of reputational
damage.218  Moreover, even when class certification is debatable,
the mere threat of a class action can have a deterring effect because
such actions expose companies to the same reputational concerns,
which may catalyze behavioral reforms and result in a company set-
tling to avoid costs associated with trial.219  Should a court deny
class certification, widespread litigation would still force the corpo-
ration to confront the same risks associated with class actions.220
Finally, if the cost of litigation passes to the customers, the
company would likely begin to lose business as customers choose
new service providers with lower prices.221  The loss of clientele is
especially pronounced in the telemedical context because of the
ease with which consumers may obtain a new provider due to the
consumer being free from the constraints of a physical market-
215. See, e.g., Romano, 246 F.R.D. at 444–47 (certifying class upon finding
that plaintiffs alleged a pattern and practice theory of liability against the entity,
which satisfied commonality and typicality requirements).
216. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997); Dewey v.
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 183 (3rd Cir. 2012).
217. See Russell M. Gold, Compensation’s Role in Deterrence, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1997, 1999–2000 (2016).  The above argument demonstrates that
even accepting the underlying rationale of the doctrine—that a corporation will
sacrifice quality of care for increased profits—such corporate conduct would not
align with the corporation’s profit-making motive.
218. See id.; see also JAMES RUBIN & BARIE CARMICHAEL, RESET: BUSINESS
AND SOCIETY IN THE NEW SOCIAL LANDSCAPE 161–92 (2018) (discussing the re-
percussive force of reputational damage for businesses, including in the context of
class actions for medical-care related injuries, and identifying its ability to cause
businesses to suffer financial losses and catalyze internal reform).
219. See RUBIN & CARMICHAEL, supra note 218, at 168–74; see also In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that class
actions place pressure on defendants to settle).
220. See supra note 212.
221. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS ET. AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 698–99 (7th ed. 2013)
(noting that when manufacturers are sued for a defective product, they will in-
crease the product’s price to cover the costs of liability, those costs will be passed
on to consumers, and the consumer will then seek out cheaper substitutes, which
will usually be safer because the substitute manufacturer will not have had to im-
pose liability costs on the consumer).
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place.222  Thus, the corporation that sacrifices patient quality of care
for potential profit will have two options:  reform its business model
and seek innovative ethical solutions for the efficient delivery of
care, or fail.
IV. CONCLUSION
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine stems from a
flawed policy rationale that does not take into account the current
state of the healthcare marketplace.  Advocates of the doctrine
have failed to provide any data that demonstrates corporate in-
volvement degrades quality of care.  Even accepting the premise
that the profit-making motive of the corporation will predominate
over any other concerns, sacrificing quality of care for efficiency
would not align with a corporation’s profit-making motive.
Telemedicine’s ability to expand access to care, however, is based
on well-founded statistical data.  States, together with entrepre-
neurs, can significantly alleviate the access-to-care issue by combin-
ing the corporate entity’s ability to expand industries and
telemedicine’s ability to expand access to care.  On balance, consid-
ering that class-action lawsuits or widespread litigation would miti-
gate any degradation in quality of care resulting from corporate
involvement, and the fact that data is at best speculative on whether
such involvement will impact quality of care, the corporate entity’s
ability to expand the telemedical industry and provide comprehen-
sive access to care outweighs any residual risk posed by abandoning
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.  To expand access to
healthcare and drive healthcare costs down, states should abandon
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine at least for the specific
context of telemedicine.
222. See, e.g., Eric Wicklund, In a Competitive Market, Telehealth Can Be a
Valuable Commodity, MHEALTH INTELLIGENCE (May 18, 2018), https://bit.ly/
2IvJUcs [https://perma.cc/C9EE-24VJ] (discussing UPMC Pinnacle’s ability to
serve former Penn State Health Milton S. Hershey Medical Center patients
through use of telemedicine and noting that telemedicine allows consumers to
“shop around” when providers are not meeting patient demand and expectations).
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